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THE IDEA OF HUMANITY: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS 
David Cole∗ 
“The alien was to be protected, not because he was a member 
of one’s family, clan, or religious community; but because he was a 
human being. In the alien, therefore, man discovered the idea of 
humanity.”1 So wrote Hermann Cohen, a Jewish philosopher, in a 
19th-century commentary on the Bible. While Cohen was interpreting 
a very different source of authority, his words point toward the 
critical moral underpinnings of an international human rights 
strategy for furthering the rights of foreign nationals. Because they 
are predicated on one’s status as a human being, rather than on one’s 
affiliation with any particular nation-state, international human 
rights are both most relevant to, and most tested by, the treatment of 
foreign nationals. 
In a landmark ruling in 2004, the Law Lords of Great Britain 
invalidated a statute authorizing indefinite preventive detention of 
foreign nationals who were suspected terrorists.2 The Court found 
that the statute conflicted with the obligation not to discriminate 
against foreign nationals, an obligation found in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which Britain had incorporated into 
 
  ∗  Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank Sean Abouchedid 
and Marian Fowler, my research assistants at Georgetown, for invaluable 
assistance in the research for this article. I presented this paper to a working 
group on human rights sponsored by Notre Dame Law School and at a human 
rights symposium sponsored by Fribourg University in Switzerland, and 
benefited greatly from the comments of the participants in both settings. 
1. H. Freedman, ed., Jeremiah, Hebrew Text & English Translation with 
an Introduction and Commentary, 52 (A. Cohen, ed., the Sancio Press 1949) 
(quoting Hermann Cohen). 
2. The Law Lords of Great Britain declared invalid a statute authorizing 
indefinite preventive detention of foreign nationals who were suspected 
terrorists. A(FC) and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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its own law in the Human Rights Act.3 The Court reasoned that a 
“suspected terrorist” poses the same threat whether he is a British 
citizen or a foreign national, and therefore there is no justification for 
treating the two differently.4 The Law Lords’ decision is the ideal 
model for the integration of human rights and immigrants’ rights. 
The Court relied on international standards, made part of domestic 
law, to enforce equality between all persons, regardless of 
nationality. 
Just six months before the Law Lords ruled, the Supreme 
Court declared that the United States had violated Yaser Hamdi’s 
constitutional rights by holding him as an enemy combatant for two 
years without charges and without any hearing in which he could 
protest his innocence and confront the evidence against him.5  The 
Court rested its decision on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, which bars the government from depriving “any person” 
of life, liberty, or property without due process.6 Yaser Hamdi, 
however, was not just any person—he was a United States citizen. 
And while the Court never explained what relevance that fact had to 
the constitutional inquiry (it has elsewhere stated that due process 
protects all persons in the United States, regardless of citizenship 
status), the Court managed to mention that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen 
eleven times.7 The attitude reflected by the Court’s repeated mantra 
of citizenship could not be more different from the approach adopted 
by the Law Lords of Great Britain. 
Are international human rights arguments likely to be 
effective in advancing immigrants’ rights in the United States? There 
are many reasons to be pessimistic. Despite its history as a nation of 
immigrants and the ever-increasing diversity of its populace, the 
United States remains a deeply parochial and nationalist culture, 
and the law shares that parochialism. International human rights 
arguments are often seen as the advocates’ last refuge, pulled out 
only when there is no other authority to cite. In the absence of an 
international forum with the power to hold the United States 
accountable, and in the face of Congressional directives that the 
international human rights treaties it has ratified are not “self-
 
3. Id. at 22. 
4. Id. at 19. 
5. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
6. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
7. Hamdi v. Rumfeld, 542 U.S. at 509, 510, 511, 516, 524, 527, 528, 531, 
532, 533, 537. 
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executing,” international human rights feel aspirational, without the 
force of law. It is not surprising, then, that international human 
rights arguments are rarely advanced in domestic U.S. courts—in 
immigration cases or elsewhere. Nor should it be surprising that in 
those few instances where such arguments are broached, they are as 
often as not ignored or summarily dismissed. 
Yet despite these substantial obstacles, there are also reasons 
to be optimistic about the potential for advancing immigrants’ rights 
through international human rights. As Hermann Cohen’s quotation 
implies, human rights are just that—human rights—and therefore 
generally do not acknowledge distinctions between citizens and 
noncitizens. The rights identified and protected in international 
human rights treaties derive from human dignity, and dignity does 
not turn on the type of passport or visa a person holds. Accordingly, 
human rights discourse offers tremendous normative power and 
potential for advancing social justice on behalf of foreign nationals in 
the United States. In some sense, it would be irresponsible not to 
explore that potential. And for a variety of reasons, now is an 
especially propitious time for such exploration. 
This essay seeks to assess the role that international human 
rights law might have in the effort to protect, strengthen, and 
develop legal protections for immigrants. I will first outline in more 
detail the difficulties that any international human rights strategy 
will confront. I will then suggest, however, that the opportunities 
that this particular historical moment offers may outweigh the 
dangers, and that in any event historical trends strongly suggest that 
we will see increasing incorporation of international norms in the 
domestic setting. Finally, I will suggest that in order to be most 
effective, advocates should adopt a three-pronged strategy: advancing 
modest claims of statutory construction and constitutional 
interpretation in the courts; advocating more expansive conceptions 
of international human rights in the political and popular realms; 
and pushing for the creation of institutions and processes to bring 
international human rights considerations into domestic 
policymaking at the outset, before disputes arise.  
I. OBSTACLES 
American law and culture pose at least three considerable 
impediments to a legal or political strategy aimed at furthering 
immigrants’ rights through international human rights. The first is 
specific to this historical moment. The attacks of September 11 
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succeeded in terrorizing the American psyche and have led to a new 
wave of anti-immigration sentiment. That sentiment may make 
resort to international human rights claims in this area especially 
risky. The anti-immigrant feeling is in part due to the fact that all 
nineteen suicide bombers were noncitizens, backed by an 
international terrorist organization comprised almost entirely of 
foreign nationals. But discrimination against immigrants is also 
founded on the fact that, as in every other serious national security 
crisis in our past, government officials have found it easier to 
sacrifice the rights of non-voting foreign nationals for the purported 
security of the nation than to ask voting Americans to sacrifice their 
own rights and liberties in the name of promises of greater security.8  
Louis Post’s description of the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920, which 
rounded up thousands of foreign nationals after a series of terrorist 
bombings, is equally applicable to the government’s post-9/11 
response: “the delirium caused by the bombings turned in the 
direction of a deportation crusade with the spontaneity of water 
seeking out the course of least resistance.”9 In such situations, 
deportation of foreign nationals is “the course of least resistance,”10 
especially when they are viewed as “them” in the us-them dichotomy 
that so often dominates public discourse and consciousness in a time 
of war. 
The targeting of foreign nationals has taken many forms, 
from incommunicado detention and torture abroad to preventive 
detention, systemic surveillance, and ethnic profiling at home. Many 
of the most troubling initiatives have been undertaken through 
immigration law. Bent and twisted to serve purposes it was never 
designed to achieve, immigration law has led to widespread secret 
arrests without charges, secret trials, denials of access to counsel, 
detention without probable cause, and even the rendering of foreign 
nationals to other countries for torture.11 Early in the aftermath of 
9/11, Attorney General John Ashcroft discovered that the 
immigration laws afforded him wide-ranging discretion—a discretion 
he expanded far beyond its already capacious boundaries—to target 
foreign nationals as “suspected terrorists” on little or no evidence of 
 
8. For development of this point, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double 
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism 72-82 (2003). 
9. Louis F. Post, The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty: A 
Personal Narrative of an Historic Official Experience 307 (1923). 
10. Id. at 307. 
11. See Cole, supra note 8, at 17-82. 
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involvement in anything remotely close to terrorist activity.12 Just as 
traffic regulations have enabled narcotics officers to engage in 
pretextual stops and searches, so immigration law has given federal 
agents the pretext they need to stop, search, monitor, and interrogate 
foreign nationals in the search for terrorists. 
The utility of immigration law and immigrant targeting to 
law enforcement officials and politicians means that invoking 
international human rights in this realm presents considerable risk.  
If immigration law is driven by the politics of fear and the course of 
least resistance, the invocation of international human rights in this 
setting may do more to harm international human rights than to 
help immigration law. The incentives to target foreign nationals may 
prove too powerful, and may lead courts, Congress, the executive, 
and the public at large to take a rather dim view of the legal 
limitations posed by international instruments. Nowhere has this 
been more evident than in the Administration’s detention and 
interrogation of foreign nationals abroad. The international laws of 
armed conflict recognize the power of a state in wartime to hold those 
fighting for the other side for the duration of the conflict, but impose 
basic limits on that power, including guarantees of fair process and 
prohibitions on torture and inhumane treatment.13 Claiming that 
this is a new kind of war, the Administration has sought to employ 
the extraordinary powers of war while evading the international law 
limits on those powers, refusing until suffering defeat in the 
Supreme Court to provide Guantanamo detainees with any sort of 
hearing to assess their status14 and maintaining in secret Justice 
Department and Pentagon memos that the international law 
prohibition on torture cannot constrain the President in wartime.15 It 
 
12. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The 
September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration 
Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (April 
2003) (describing ways that the Justice Department abused immigration law to 
hold foreign nationals “of interest” to the 9/11 investigation on little or no basis 
for suspicion); see also Cole, supra note 8, at 17-21. 
13. See generally Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138 
(establishing standards relating to the detainment of prisoners of war). 
14. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
15. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto Gonzales, Regarding 
Standards for Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 
2002), reprinted in Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and 
the War on Terror, 115 (2004) [hereinafter Torture Memo]. Working Group 
Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment 
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has long been said that civil liberties are some of the first casualties 
of war, but international human rights may be even earlier to go. 
The second reason to be pessimistic about the effectiveness of 
international human rights claims lies in the skeptical reception 
such claims have long been given in the United States. Until 
recently, a lawyer litigating for social change in the United States 
would use international human rights arguments only after all 
statutory and constitutional law arguments had failed, and even then 
without much hope of actually prevailing. American legal culture has 
long viewed international human rights as “mere surplusage” when 
it comes to domestic law. Many assume that international human 
rights norms are not likely to provide greater guarantees than does 
the Constitution. Congress has often made this a self-fulfilling 
prophecy by adopting reservations in ratifying international human 
rights conventions providing that the treaties not be read as 
mandating anything more than what American constitutional law 
guarantees.16 There is a dearth of lawyers trained to employ 
international human rights arguments, and judges are unaccustomed 
to hearing such arguments, much less to taking them seriously. A 
variety of legal doctrines erect barriers to private enforcement of 
international human rights in domestic courts, and there is no 
effective international legal forum for enforcement against the 
United States.17 All of these circumstances combine to make 
 
of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations (April 4, 2003), 
reprinted in id. at 187. 
16. Congress adopted a reservation for Article 16 of the Convention on 
Torture that the prohibition on “degrading treatment” was no more than a 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” within what the Eighth 
Amendment guarantees. Resolution of Ratification of the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment §I(1), 
101st Cong, 136 Cong. Rec. 17491 (1990). Congress also adopted a reservation for 
Article 6 of the ICCPR negating the provision against the death penalty for 
minors. Resolution of Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights §I(2), 102nd Cong., 138 Cong. Rec. 4783 (1992) (enacted). See 
generally Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human 
Rights Treaties, 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 347 (2000) (discussing practice of treaty 
reservations). 
17. See Michael Byers, The Law And Politics Of The Pinochet Case, 10 
Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 415, 418 (2000), for a general analysis of the difficulties 
faced prosecuting international human rights violations in domestic courts. . See 
also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (stating that the plaintiff 
alleging participation by the Drug Enforcement Agency in his abduction from 
Mexico for trial in the United States was not entitled to a remedy under the Alien 
Tort Statute). 
2006] IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS 633 
international human rights appear illusory and utopian, not real 
constraints to be taken seriously by the political or legal branches of 
government. 
The skepticism is evident in Supreme Court opinions. In 
2004, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the Alien Tort 
Statute, which had for twenty years been the principal avenue for 
development of international human rights law in U.S. courts.18 The 
Court limited the Alien Tort Statute to enforcement of those 
international human rights norms that already have the specificity 
and uniform consensus that characterized the three international 
law violations recognized as affording private individuals a cause of 
action at the time of the Alien Tort Statute’s enactment in 1798—
injuries against ambassadors, denial of safe conduct, and piracy.19 
While the Court significantly left “the door ajar” to U.S. courts’ 
enforcement of such widely established international human rights 
claims,20 its limitation on the types of claims that are cognizable is 
likely to make U.S. courts inhospitable for the development of 
international human rights claims in Alien Tort Statute lawsuits. 
As I will suggest later, the Sosa decision is by no means a 
fatal bar to international human rights advocates in domestic courts, 
particularly where they invoke international law as a guide to the 
interpretation of statutory or constitutional questions rather than as 
an independent source of relief. But perhaps more significantly, the 
Court’s reasoning for its narrow construction of the Alien Tort 
Statute reflects substantial judicial discomfort with playing an active 
role in the development of international human rights law. The 
Court listed several reasons for construing the judicial role narrowly, 
and all are likely to be cited by defendants in international human 
rights cases as reasons for judicial restraint in this domain generally. 
The Court noted that while it has long been recognized that the law 
of nations is a part of federal common law, modern conceptions of 
both common law and the role of federal courts contemplate a much 
more limited role for courts than was assumed at the time of the 
Framers, when it was thought that common law was found, not 
made, by courts.21 The Court also reasoned that modern 
jurisprudence disfavors judicially created private rights of action and 
that the interpretation of international human rights will often 
 
18. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692. 
19. Id. at 725. 
20. Id. at 729. 
21. Id. at 725. 
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implicate matters of foreign relations best left to the political 
branches.22 Moreover, the Court saw “no Congressional mandate to 
seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of 
nations.”23 
Finally, even apart from the specific challenges posed by the 
post-9/11 era, immigration law is an especially difficult arena for 
advancing individual rights claims of any kind, much less those 
based on international law. The Supreme Court has long 
characterized the immigration power as “plenary,” and government 
lawyers inevitably open their briefs in immigrants’ rights cases by 
quoting decisions suggesting that the principal limits on that 
“plenary power” are political, not legal, in nature.24 The Supreme 
Court has only rarely declared an immigration law unconstitutional, 
and the casebooks are replete with examples of injustices that would 
plainly not be tolerated (legally or politically) had the victims been 
U.S. citizens.25 As the Supreme Court reiterated in 2002, upholding a 
statute imposing mandatory preventive detention on foreign 
nationals, a practice that would never pass constitutional muster if 
applied to citizens, “Congress regularly makes rules [for aliens] that 
 
22. Id. at 727. 
23. Id. at 728. 
24. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595 (1952) (“[The 
Court is] urged to apply some doctrine of atonement and redemption. Congress 
might well have done so, but it is not for the judiciary to usurp the function of 
granting absolution or pardon [for immigrants]. We cannot do so for deportable 
ex-convicts, even though they have served a term of imprisonment calculated to 
bring about their reformation.”); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 (1976) (“[I]n 
the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress 
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); see 
generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and 
Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 365 (2002) (arguing that 
although the Zadvydas decision purports to establish constitutional limits to 
Congress’s plenary power over immigration, it is unlikely to do so in practice); 
Cornelia T. L. Pillard and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny Of Plenary 
Power: Judicial And Executive Branch Decision Making In Miller v. Albright, 
1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (1998) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s use of a deferential 
standard derived from Congress’s plenary power over immigration to evaluate 
the constitutionality of a discriminatory immigration statute instead of using 
heightened scrutiny); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: 
Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 925 (1994-1995) 
(reviewing the development of the plenary power doctrine up to the mid-1990s 
and advancing predictions for its future). 
25. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (upholding retroactive 
application of immigration laws to make a foreign national deportable for conduct 
that was legal at the time he engaged in it). 
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would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”26 
These concerns make clear that international human rights 
arguments are no magic sword in the stone for immigrants’ rights 
advocates. In their own respective spheres, advancing immigrants’ 
rights and international human rights have been uphill battles. 
Combining the two might well be dismissed as “naïve and dangerous” 
idealism, as President Bush might put it.27  But as I will show in the 
next section, each of the obstacles identified above simultaneously 
provides an opportunity. With the right emphasis and tactics, 
international human rights arguments may well prove a critical tool 
in the arsenal of those who seek to advance immigrants’ rights. 
II. OPPORTUNITIES 
It may not always be true that the flipside of obstacle is 
opportunity, but in this instance each of the phenomena described 
above has a correlative benefit. First, while anti-immigrant fear and 
bias pervade the post-9/11 atmosphere, the realities of waging a war 
against an international organization or organizations dispersed in a 
large number of countries underscore the need for global legitimacy 
and have the potential to shore up arguments for respecting our 
international obligations. Second, although skepticism about 
international human rights remains a significant strand in American 
legal culture, the trend line appears headed in the opposite direction, 
toward a transnational legal justice system in which, as Harold Koh 
has argued, the national and the international increasingly merge.28 
In my view, we may well be in the midst of a paradigm shift on the 
subject of international authority with interesting parallels to the 
shift from state to federal power that the United States experienced 
in the wake of the New Deal. Finally, the source of the “plenary 
 
26. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 (1976); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 
U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003); see David Cole, Not Too Much for an Alien¸ Wash. Post, 
May 7, 2003, at A3; see generally David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process 
Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 Emory L.J. 1003 (2002) (criticizing the 
contemporary practice of indefinitely detaining aliens subject to a final order of 
deportation for the sole purpose of carrying out 9/11-related criminal 
investigations, which have thus far proven fruitless). 
27. Commission on Presidential Debates, Second Presidential Candidates’ 
Debate, October 8, 2004, available at http://www.debates.org/pages/tr 
ans2004c.html (criticizing John Kerry’s proposal for bilateral relations with 
North Korea as “naive and dangerous”). 
28. See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 Am. 
J. Int’l. L. 43, 56 (2004). 
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power” of immigration has long been identified as international law 
itself, and therefore international law is already implicated in the 
definition and scope of that power. In the early days of the republic, 
international law considered power over immigration as inherent in 
sovereignty itself.29 But the evolution of international human rights 
has placed significant restrictions on sovereignty, and since the 
immigration power rests in significant part on international legal 
foundations, it may be particularly susceptible to those restrictions. 
The double-edged nature of the post-9/11 atmosphere has 
been made painfully clear by the revelations of torture and other 
degrading treatment at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib Prison in 
Iraq, Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, and unnamed CIA 
detention centers around the world.30 The path to Abu Ghraib was 
paved by the Administration’s desire to push the limits of torture in 
coercing detainees to talk in interrogation rooms around the world. 
That desire led to a truly astounding opinion from the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC)—supposedly the legal conscience of the Executive 
Branch—that treated the torture prohibition as if it were a tax code, 
and as if the main function of the lawyer was not to ensure that the 
letter and spirit of the law be honored, but to find loopholes in the 
code. 31 The OLC opinion argued that it was permissible to threaten a 
detainee with death, as long as it was not a threat of “imminent 
death;” that it was permissible to administer personality-altering 
drugs as long as they did not “penetrate to the core of an individual’s 
ability to perceive the world around him;” that infliction of mental 
harm was appropriate as long as it was not “prolonged;” and that 
physical pain was acceptable as long as it was not the kind of severe 
pain that might accompany “organ failure.”32 It even went so far as to 
argue that the President could authorize out-and-out torture in his 
capacity as Commander-in-Chief and that it would be 
unconstitutional for international human rights treaties or federal 
statutes to ban him from doing so.33  The Convention Against 
Torture, which the United States has signed and ratified, 
 
29. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing 
Supreme Court decisions noting that immigration power stems from 
international law conceptions of sovereignty) (and cases cited therein), rev’d on 
other grounds, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003). 
30. See generally Danner, supra note 15 (providing extensive reporting of 
the Abu Ghraib torture scandal). 
31. See Bybee Memorandum, August 2, 2002, supra note 15. 
32. Id. at 119-25. 
33. Id. at 146-49. 
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categorically forbids torture under any circumstances.34 Yet as the 
Justice Department memo demonstrated, the war on terrorism 
creates powerful temptations to flout international law. 
Once the photos from Abu Ghraib were released worldwide, 
politicians in and out of the Administration almost immediately 
realized that this instance of pushing the bounds of international law 
had backfired. Reactions in and around Washington sometimes 
expressed concern for the injuries suffered by the Iraqi detainees, but 
nearly always reserved their deepest concern for the disastrous 
impact these pictures would have on American foreign policy.35 That 
expression of concern illustrated what the 9/11 Commission later 
noted in its report—that success in fighting terrorism turns in large 
measure on perceptions of the United States held around the world.36 
If we are seen as pursuing illegitimate means in the effort to keep 
ourselves secure, we will suffer serious consequences, as we will find 
it more difficult to obtain the cooperation we need in order to find 
and incapacitate terrorist threats, and Al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups will find it easier to find willing recruits to the fight against 
us. 
The Defense Department itself has recognized that we must 
take seriously the battle for “hearts and minds.”37 That reality 
 
34. The Convention Against Torture provides that, “No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a 
justification of torture.” UN Convention on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 (entered into force June 
26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention on Torture]. 
35. “[N]egligence is anything but benign in the damage it threatens to our 
national security and foreign policy interests, at a particularly dangerous time.” 
Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy On The Abuse Of Prisoners in U.S. Military 
Custody (May 5, 2004), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/index.html; “I 
think it was a failure of political judgment or public relations judgment not a 
failure to do his job and see that the investigations got done and the people got 
punished.” Representative James Woolsey, quoted in Online NewsHour, 
Rumsfeld Under Fire (May 6, 2004) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/whi 
te_house/jan-june04/rumsfeld_5-06.html. 
36. National Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 
9/11 Commission Report 375, 376 (2004). 
37. “The information campaign—or as some still would have it, ‘the war of 
ideas,’ or the struggle for ‘hearts and minds’—is important to every war effort.” 
Office of the Under Sec’y of Def. for Acquisition, Tech. & Logistics, Report of the 
Def. Sci. Bd. Task Force on Strategic Commc’n 39 (September 2004), available at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/20 
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creates an opportunity for advocates concerned about the treatment 
of foreign nationals in the war on terrorism. The way we treat other 
countries’ nationals is covered extensively in the foreign media, and 
arguably much of the anti-American resentment so prevalent around 
the world today can be attributed to the perception that the United 
States is not willing to accord to “them” the dignity and respect that 
international human rights demand, and is not willing to play by the 
rules that international law sets out.38 Moreover, the very fact that 
foreign nationals are so often the first targets of our security 
initiatives makes foreign nations and foreign media potential 
partners in calling attention to violations of international human 
rights here at home. 
Guantanamo is a perfect example. Nationals of forty-two 
separate nations have been held there,39 and as a result Guantanamo 
quickly became a focal point for international condemnation of the 
United States’ policies in the war on terror, even in Great Britain, 
our closest ally in the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq.40  The 
international condemnation directed at Guantanamo, articulated in 
terms of international law, in turn affected the legal landscape at 
home, and very likely played a significant role in the Supreme 
Court’s decision not only to hear the Guantanamo detainees’ cases, 
but to resoundingly reject the Administration’s position that its 
actions at Guantanamo were immune from any judicial or legal 
limitations. Thus, while the war on terror makes immigrants the 
likely targets of most of the worst excesses, that fact in turn makes 
fundamental international norms more relevant, in both diplomatic 
and legal terms. 
Phrasing rights claims in the language of international 
human rights may facilitate international pressure. When one 
charges that the United States government has violated the First or 
 
04-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf. 
38. Cole, supra note 8, at 183-204. 
39. A Place in the Sun, Beyond the Law, Economist, May 10, 2003, at 12; 
David Cole, Korematsu II?, The Nation, Dec. 8, 2003, at 6. 
40. British Law Lord John Steyn stated, “Ought the British Government to 
make plain publicly and unambiguously its condemnation of the utter 
lawlessness at Guantanamo Bay?” Lord Steyn also called the treatment of 
prisoners “a monstrous failure of justice.” Anthony Sampson, The Damaging 
Legacy Of Our Silence Over This Offshore Haven For Torturers, The Independent 
(London), June 19, 2004 at 39; Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12-16, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 
(2004) (Nos. 03-343, 03-334). 
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Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, foreign observers are likely to 
defer to Americans on the issue. What basis does a Swiss or Saudi 
citizen have to judge whether given actions violate American 
constitutional norms? Where, by contrast, the charges are framed in 
terms of international human rights, they speak a transnational 
language, one with which citizens and lawyers from any number of 
countries will feel more comfortable. There is no need to defer to the 
United States, for example, on what the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights or the Geneva Conventions say. Thus, 
international human rights language facilitates international moral 
and legal pressure on troubling U.S. practices. 
The second obstacle to international human rights 
advocacy—the unfamiliarity, skepticism, or even hostility of 
American judges, lawyers, and others to international law 
arguments—also has a flipside. “Nationalists” opposed to the 
intervention of international standards remain in significant 
positions of power—see, for example, President Bush’s summary 
dismissal during the 2004 presidential debates of Senator Kerry’s 
suggestion of a “global test” for going to war, or see Justice Scalia’s 
scathing criticism of any invocation of international or foreign court 
decisions in interpreting our Constitution.41 But the path of history 
toward globalization suggests that adoption of a more transnational 
or international perspective is virtually inevitable. 
Indeed, when historians look back at the current period, they 
may well conclude that we are in the midst of a fundamental 
paradigm shift on the subject of international law—akin to the shift 
from state to federal power that the nation experienced in the post-
New Deal era with respect to business and labor regulation under 
the Commerce Clause and individual rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Just as the post-New Deal and 
civil rights eras saw a shift in authority based on a recognition of the 
increasing importance of uniform federal standards with respect to 
the rights of workers, consumers, criminal defendants, and members 
of minority groups, so too today we may be seeing a shift in attitudes 
about the role of national and international law in the regulation of 
business and basic human rights. Just as the integrated national 
 
41. George W. Bush, Remarks at the First Presidential Debate between 
President George Bush and Senator John Kerry (Sept. 30, 2004) (transcript 
available from The Washington Post), available at http://www.washingt 
onpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_0930.html; Roper v. Simmons, 
125 S. Ct. 1183, 1226-29 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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economy required more centralized national power, so the forces of 
globalization today are rendering national borders less critical in the 
articulation and protection of legal rights. 
The New Deal transformation in American constitutional law 
was so significant that Professor Bruce Ackerman has labeled it a 
“constitutional moment,” likening it to constitutional amendments 
that fundamentally alter the understanding of our governing 
framework.42 Prior to the New Deal, business regulation was thought 
to be a matter for local and state regulation, and Congress was 
authorized to act only when it sought to regulate commerce that was 
actually interstate.43 The Court accordingly struck down a range of 
federal statutes designed to protect workers from exploitation by 
employers. Similarly, protection of individual rights was generally 
considered a matter for the states. The Court generally viewed the 
Bill of Rights as applying only to the federal government, and not to 
the states.44 But the post-New Deal era saw both of these rules 
reversed. The Court, recognizing that we now had an integrated 
national economy, acknowledged Congress’s “plenary power” to 
regulate any conduct that Congress might rationally believe affected 
interstate commerce.45 Also, the Court increasingly interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to “incorporate” the 
specific protections of the Bill of Rights and apply them to the 
states.46 Both developments had the effect of harmonizing the 
obligations imposed on federal and state governments and giving the 
federal government substantially greater power, in recognition of the 
need for federal protection of the rights of workers, consumers, and 
minority groups. 
There are signs of a similar shift toward globalization and 
international human rights today. The international human rights 
movement, a product of the past fifty years, has grown from a 
nascent idea into a vast network of international treaties, 
 
42. See Bruce Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law (1984). 
43. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A. L. A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
44. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New 
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
45. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937). 
46. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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institutions, and non-governmental organizations.47 The U.N. 
Declaration of Rights dates back to 1948.48 In its wake came the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 and 
regional human rights treaties for the Americas, Europe, and 
Africa.49 In the 1990s, Congress ratified three important human 
rights treaties—the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture, and the 
Convention Against All Forms of Racial Discrimination.50 Similar 
trends are evident elsewhere. Great Britain has incorporated the 
European Convention on Human Rights into its own domestic law by 
enacting a Human Rights Act, and numerous Eastern European 
countries have signed on to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its transnational enforcement regime.51 Meanwhile, here 
at home, human rights non-governmental organizations have 
increasingly turned their human rights scrutiny homeward, bringing 
the tactics of shaming to bear on their home country in reports 
criticizing the United States’ treatment of immigrants, racial 
minorities, and criminal defendants, especially those on death row.52 
 
47. See Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human 
Rights: Visions Seen (2d ed. 2003). 
48. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)(A), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 127, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 9, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 13, June 26, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); American Convention on Human Rights, 
art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
50. ICCPR, supra note 49; Convention on Torture, supra note 34; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. C, 95-2 
(1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
51. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); all Council of Europe member 
states are party to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Council of 
Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&
CL=ENG. 
52. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Scores of Muslim Men Jailed Without 
Charge (June 27, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/ 
27/usdom11213.htm; Amnesty International, USA (Texas): Death Penalty: David 
Martinez (July 22, 2005), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library 
/Index/ENGAMR511152005?open&of=ENG-USA; Amnesty International, Report 
2005, United States of America, available at http://web.amnesty.org/re 
port2005/usa-summary-eng. 
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These developments have not been lost on the courts. The 
federal courts have entertained tort suits for violations of core human 
rights norms since 1980,53 and while the Supreme Court’s Sosa 
decision will slow that trend, it significantly left “the door ajar” to 
such claims in the future.54 In a series of recent constitutional 
decisions, over the spirited dissents of “nationalists,” the Supreme 
Court has increasingly looked to international and foreign law 
decisions in construing our own Constitution. In Lawrence v. Texas, 
the Supreme Court cited decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights in concluding that a prohibition on same-sex sodomy violated 
the right to privacy (and overturning a contrary decision from only 
seventeen years earlier in which the Court had not even mentioned 
the European Court of Human Rights’ decision).55 Justice Ginsburg 
cited international treaty materials in her concurring opinion 
upholding affirmative action in the University of Michigan Law 
School case.56  In Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the Court 
relied on international and foreign law developments around the 
world in declaring that imposing the death penalty on juveniles and 
those with mental retardation was “cruel and unusual” in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.57 
Just as judicial developments in the post-New Deal and civil 
rights eras reflected changes in the society at large, so too these 
glimmers of attention to international human rights principles arise 
in the context of globalization.58 Economic treaties like NAFTA and 
the GATT and institutions like the World Trade Organization and 
the European Community all point in the same direction—toward 
more transnational regulation. Businesses are increasingly organized 
on an international scale, and nationalist protectionism interferes 
 
53. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
54. Julian Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on 
Terrorism, 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 205, 208 (2005). 
55. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003). 
56. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
57. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 
125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194-95 (2005); see also Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984 
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (noting consensus in the 
international community against executing juveniles). 
58. See Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree 327-47 (2000) 
(discussing the “backlash” of people who feel brutalized by globalization); Thomas 
Friedman, The World is Flat (2005) (discussing globalization’s effect on the 
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with free trade and development. Meanwhile, the internet and 
cheaper and faster international travel have shrunk the world and 
made international exchange at all levels much more prevalent. 
While there are voices of opposition, to be sure, the trend line seems 
clear. And as the world grows increasingly interdependent and 
transnational, international human rights standards are likely to 
command greater respect from our own domestic institutions. In the 
midst of a paradigm shift, its significance is not always self-evident.59 
We now know that the shift from a local to a national economy had 
momentous implications for the constitutional balance of powers; it 
seems possible that an equally historic shift may be taking place on 
the global level now. And if that is true, Congress, the President, and 
the courts will have to be increasingly open to international law 
arguments in the years to come. 
The third obstacle identified above is specific to immigration 
law—the plenary power doctrine. As Judge Jack Weinstein has 
written, however, the fact that the plenary power doctrine finds its 
source in international law conceptions of sovereignty makes it 
especially susceptible to developments in international law that 
restrict the prerogative of the sovereign: 
The Supreme Court has repeated that the basis for 
Congress’s extremely broad power over aliens comes not 
from the Constitution itself, but from international law. . . . 
Since Congress’s power over aliens rests at least in part on 
international law, it should come as no shock that it may be 
limited by changing international law norms. . . . It is 
inappropriate to sustain such plenary power based on a 
1920 understanding of international law, when the 2002 
conception is radically different.60 
The Tenth Circuit made a similar point in applying 
international law limits to the power to detain indefinitely excludable 
Mariel Cubans: “[W]e note that in upholding the plenary power of 
Congress over exclusion and deportation of aliens, the Supreme 
 
59. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“Not every epochal case has come in epochal trappings. Jones & 
Laughlin did not reject the direct-indirect standard in so many words; it just said 
the relation of the regulated subject matter to commerce was direct enough. But 
we know what happened.”) (internal citations omitted). 
60. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on 
other grounds, 329 F.3d. 51 (2d Cir. 2003). The district court cited numerous 
Supreme Court decisions noting that the immigration power is founded on 
international law conceptions of sovereignty, including Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892), and Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587-88. 
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Court has sought support in international law principles. It seems 
proper then to consider international law principles for notions of 
fairness . . .”61 The concept that international law might affect 
immigration law is not novel. Indeed, the domestic rules governing 
asylum, withholding of deportation, and relief from removal under 
the Convention Against Torture are each predicated on international 
treaties.62 Thus, international human rights norms have already 
been applied in the immigration setting, and therefore extending 
those norms further may be easier here than in areas of the law that 
have not traditionally been framed by international law. 
These opportunities, taken together with the universalist 
foundation of human rights, suggest an almost natural alliance 
between international human rights and immigrants’ rights. The 
considerable obstacles to progress should not be minimized, but the 
opportunities are so significant, and the trend toward transnational 
norms so strong, that it would be irresponsible not to seek better 
integration of international human rights concepts into the effort to 
protect and advance immigrants’ rights in the United States. 
III. STRATEGIES 
There is no one grand strategy for incorporating 
international human rights into immigration law. Different forums 
and different issues are likely to dictate different approaches. 
Nonetheless, three broad themes emerge. In litigation, international 
human rights law should be invoked primarily as a guide to the 
interpretation of immigration statutes and of constitutional 
protections for foreign nationals. In the political arena of public 
advocacy, however, activists need not tie their arguments to the 
interpretation of domestic statutes and constitutional provisions. 
They should invoke international human rights norms directly. In 
the public advocacy realm, it is particularly important to be 
cognizant of the potential for bringing international pressure to bear 
on the United States. Finally, advocates should give thought to 
developing and supporting institutional mechanisms that might 
encourage the political branches to consider the international human 
rights implications of their actions proactively. 
 
61. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 
1981). 
62. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, 
art.1, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force April 22, 1924); 
Convention on Torture, supra note 34. 
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A. Litigation 
When bringing international human rights claims in United 
States courts, litigants are more likely to be successful if they can 
frame their arguments in statutory or constitutional terms. Direct 
invocation of international human rights laws is extremely difficult, 
because, as noted above, most international human rights treaties 
that we have ratified are said to be “non-self-executing,” meaning 
that they do not create a private right of action absent express 
Congressional legislation. In addition, as the Supreme Court noted 
recently in Sosa, there are significant obstacles to raising customary 
international law claims directly as a part of federal common law. 
While a subset of such claims remains viable after Sosa, the Court 
signaled that courts should be hesitant to find such claims actionable 
absent a high degree of specificity and international consensus about 
the right invoked.63 
Courts have been more hospitable, however, to arguments 
that international human rights norms are an appropriate guide for 
statutory or constitutional interpretation. In 1987, for example, the 
Supreme Court relied on our obligations under the Refugee 
Convention in interpreting the “withholding” provision of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, although it justified doing so on 
grounds of specific legislative intent—Congress had made clear that 
it enacted the “withholding” provision precisely to bring the United 
States into conformity with the Refugee Convention.64 In Ma v. Reno, 
the Ninth Circuit relied on international law prohibitions against 
arbitrary detention to construe immigration law to prohibit indefinite 
detention of foreign nationals who were subject to final deportation 
orders but could not be removed.65 District courts have also relied on 
international protections of aliens and children to restrict the 
deportation power, interpreting immigration law bars on 
humanitarian relief for “criminal aliens” not to apply retroactively 
where application of the bar would infringe on international law.66 
The Supreme Court has long ruled that it is appropriate as a 
 
63. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732, 738 (2004). 
64. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
65. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818-20, 829 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2002). 
66.  Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on 
other grounds, 329 F.3d. 51 (2d Cir. 2003); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp.2d 206, 
231 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Mojica v. Meissner, 970 F. Supp.2d 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). All 
three of these decisions were written by Judge Weinstein. 
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background rule of statutory construction to presume that Congress 
seeks to legislate in conformity with our international obligations. 
Thus, Chief Justice John Marshall famously declared in The 
Charming Betsy that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed 
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains.”67 While Congress may—as a matter of domestic law—
override international law, this presumption means that absent a 
clear conflict, courts should interpret federal statutes to conform to 
international law obligations. To do so, the courts must by necessity 
take account of and interpret applicable international law norms. 
Invoking international law not directly, but as an aid to 
statutory construction, is responsive to many of the concerns that 
have been raised about more direct reliance on international human 
rights claims. The concerns articulated in Sosa about the dangers of 
generating common law through customary international law are 
either not raised or muted substantially when international law is 
invoked only as an interpretive guide. For example, the Court’s 
concerns about the propriety of judicial lawmaking are not so sharply 
at stake when the Court is interpreting a statute enacted by 
Congress, for statuary construction has always been viewed as an 
appropriate judicial function. Moreover, if Congress disagrees with 
the Court, it is free to amend the statute to reflect that disagreement. 
Thus, the exercise of this power is always subject to a democratic 
check. Similarly, the concern about creating private rights of action 
is not implicated where the courts rely upon international law not to 
give rise to a lawsuit, but to inform the parameters of a federal 
statute in the course of a lawsuit authorized by that statute. Thus, 
using international human rights to inform interpretation of 
immigration law raises far fewer concerns about judicial activism 
than allowing parties to bring tort suits directly under customary 
international law. 
Statuary construction arguments also avoid the problem of 
non-self-executing treaties. The fact that an international treaty is 
not self-executing, while generally a bar to direct invocation of that 
treaty by individual litigants, does not preclude an argument that 
U.S. statutes should be interpreted in light of the treaty. The 
decision to ratify a treaty without making it self-executing is a 
 
67. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804). The Supreme Court reiterated this injunction in Lauritzeen v. Larson, 
345 U.S. 571 (1953), in which it held that admiralty law under the Jones Act 
should be interpreted in conformity with international law. 
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decision to deny litigants a private right to sue directly under the 
treaty. But even where it is not self-executing, a signed and ratified 
treaty obligation is nonetheless an obligation of the United States, 
and therefore subject to the interpretive mandate of The Charming 
Betsy.68 As one court has said, “Congress can be assumed, in the 
absence of a statement to the contrary, to be legislating in conformity 
with international law and to be cognizant of the country’s need . . . 
to set an example with respect to human rights obligations.”69 
Using international human rights law as a guide to the 
interpretation of statutes is also consistent with a general feature of 
the courts’ immigration law jurisprudence, which has often sought to 
resolve cases through statutory construction.70 Thus, the Supreme 
Court has rarely held any immigration law unconstitutional, but has 
often interpreted immigration law to avoid constitutional problems. 
It did so most recently in a pair of cases decided in its 2000 term. In 
the first, Zadvydas v. Davis,71 the Court interpreted a statute that 
appeared to authorize indefinite detention of foreign nationals 
subject to deportation orders. Noting the serious constitutional 
concerns that would arise were the statute so construed, the Court 
interpreted it to require release of such foreign nationals after six 
months if removal was not reasonably foreseeable in the future.72  In 
the second, INS v. St. Cyr,73 the Court faced a statute that appeared 
on its face to deny any judicial review to foreign nationals ordered 
deported based on certain criminal convictions. The Court noted that 
a serious constitutional issue would be raised if such persons were 
denied habeas corpus, and interpreted the statute to preserve habeas 
 
68. See Ralph Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of 
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1163, 1180-82 and n.332 
(1990); Louis Henkin, Evolving Concepts of International Human Rights and the 
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69. Maria, 68 F. Supp.2d at 231; see also Beharry, 183 F. Supp.2d at 593. 
70. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of 
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 
Yale L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court has consistently resolved 
constitutional issues in the immigration setting through the tactic of statutory 
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71. 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). 
72. Id. 
73. 533 U.S. 289, 300-02 (2001). 
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corpus review.74 
Thus, the Court is accustomed to interpreting immigration 
statutes against their apparent meaning in order to avoid 
constitutional difficulties. Arguments that immigration statutes 
should also be construed to avoid clashes with international human 
rights law should therefore sound familiar to judges deciding 
immigration cases. 
Using international human rights law to inform 
constitutional interpretation poses a different and more controversial 
issue. In the statutory construction setting, the argument is that 
Congress should be assumed to have acted consistently with our 
international law obligations, just as it should be assumed to have 
acted consistently with its constitutional obligations. In the 
constitutional setting, litigants are often invoking relatively recent 
developments in international human rights law to inform an 
evolving conception of constitutional rights. Originalists object that 
international norms developed in the past fifty years have little or no 
relevance to the meaning of constitutional provisions drafted two 
hundred years ago. Others note that international human rights 
norms do not have the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution, as 
“we the people” did not define them, nor do “we the people” have the 
power to change them if we dislike them. In addition, the stakes are 
much greater with constitutional interpretation. When the courts 
interpret a statute to conform to international law, it is always open 
to Congress to disagree simply by amending the statute to make 
clear its intention to override international law. But when the courts 
interpret a constitutional provision in light of international law 
developments, the political branches are more limited in their ability 
to respond. 
Nonetheless, as summarized above, the Supreme Court has 
been open to relying on international law in interpreting a range of 
constitutional provisions. Arguments for the relevance of 
international law are strongest with respect to those constitutional 
provisions that most clearly contemplate the development of evolving 
norms. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” for example, has long been understood to articulate an 
evolving standard, and evidence from human rights treaties and 
other countries’ practices may therefore be relevant evidence as to 
 
74. Id. 
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what is considered “cruel and unusual” today.75 The Due Process 
Clause has also been understood to express an evolving 
understanding of protected liberties, and the Supreme Court has 
looked to the practices of “English-speaking peoples”76 in assessing 
what liberties were fundamental to “ordered liberty” and therefore 
incorporated under the Due Process Clause and applicable to the 
states.77 Thus, challenges to the fairness of deportation and detention 
procedures in the immigration context can profitably look to 
international standards to guide the interpretation of the 
constitutional rights that apply. 
Two examples of this approach from recent cases illustrate 
the different ways in which international law arguments may be 
employed. In Clark v. Martinez,78 the Supreme Court considered 
whether the rule it established in Zadvydas v. Davis for deportable 
aliens ought to be extended to excludable aliens. As noted above, the 
Zadvydas ruling was based on statutory interpretation, but that 
interpretation was in turn driven by a concern that the statute might 
be unconstitutional were it interpreted to authorize indefinite 
detention. In Clark, the government argued that even though the 
same statute governs the detention of excludable and deportable 
aliens, the statute need not be construed in the same manner for 
excludable aliens because, as foreign nationals who have not been 
admitted to the United States, they are not entitled to constitutional 
protections. 
The Court in Clark ultimately resolved the case by 
interpreting the statute without reference to international law. It 
reasoned that the same statute should not mean two different things 
for two different categories of persons, where nothing in the statutory 
language suggested that the excludable/deportable distinction was 
relevant to Congress’s consideration.79 But one can imagine the 
decision being written differently, relying on international law 
arguments either to support the Court’s statutory construction or to 
inform its constitutional analysis. 
 
75. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (looking to 
developments in international law to inform Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (same). 
76. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 
U.S. 25, 28 (1949). 
77. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 54 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325 (1937)). 
78. 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
79. Id. at 725-26. 
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First, the Court might have used international law to inform 
its statutory construction. Assuming arguendo that foreign nationals 
outside the United States do not have the same constitutional rights 
as foreign nationals within the United States, they might well have 
the same rights under international human rights law, which 
generally does not distinguish between human beings based on 
citizenship or location. If that were the case, then the Court would be 
obliged to seek to interpret the statute to conform to international 
law. Thus, where the Court in Zadvydas interpreted the detention 
statute narrowly to avoid the constitutional concerns that would 
arise were it read to authorize indefinite detention, so too the Court 
in Clark could have interpreted the detention statute in the same 
way in order to avoid the international human rights concerns that 
would arise were it read to authorize indefinite detention. In this 
argument, international human rights prohibitions on arbitrary 
detention do the same work in guiding statutory construction as the 
constitutional prohibition on arbitrary detention did in guiding 
statutory construction in Zadvydas. 
Second, international human rights law could have been 
invoked to inform constitutional interpretation in Clark as a guide to 
what due process itself requires for a foreign national in Martinez’s 
position. In the 1950s, the Supreme Court ruled that foreign 
nationals held at the border who had not entered the country were 
not entitled, as a constitutional matter, to due process with respect to 
their entry,80 and some have interpreted those decisions as holding 
that foreign nationals outside the borders are not entitled to 
constitutional protections.81 But that interpretation is contestable,82 
and one could argue that Martinez should be entitled to the same 
constitutional due process protections, at least with respect to 
indefinite detention, as was Zadvydas. International human rights 
law, which prohibits arbitrary detention without regard to the 
citizenship status of the detainee, might be invoked to inform the 
 
80. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); 
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
81. The government has frequently advanced this view. See, e.g., Brief for 
the Respondents, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334); Reply Brief for 
the Petitioners, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2004) (No. 03-878). 
82. See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration 
Detention, 51 Emory L.J. 1003, 1033 (2002) (arguing that cases such as United 
States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy establish “only . . . that because non-citizens 
have no liberty or property interest in entry they have no right to object to the 
procedures used to exclude them.”). 
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Court’s understanding of constitutional due process. 
Cases like Clark, which raise claims on behalf of foreign 
nationals who have never been admitted to the United States, are an 
especially important locus for international human rights claims 
precisely because U.S. constitutional law is often viewed as extending 
few or no rights to foreign nationals in that status. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush83 to extend the writ of habeas 
corpus to foreign nationals held as enemy combatants at 
Guantanamo Bay suggests that the Supreme Court may be ready to 
question some of its earlier precedents in this regard, or at least to 
limit them to their facts. Arguments that international human rights 
law demands that such persons be afforded basic protections may 
offer important support in that development. 
International human rights claims are also important to 
pursue in the context of detentions and deportations involving people 
who have been admitted to the United States. While these 
individuals are generally protected by those provisions of the 
Constitution that are not expressly limited to citizens, the content of 
the rights extended to foreign nationals remains ambiguous. Because 
domestic law already accords such individuals constitutional rights, 
litigants may be less likely to advance international human rights 
claims. But invocations of international law may nonetheless be 
helpful as a guide to the formulation of the domestic guarantees at 
issue. 
In Turkmen v. Ashcroft,84 for example, a case I am working on 
with the Center for Constitutional Rights, foreign nationals swept up 
in the post-9/11 preventive detention campaign sued the Attorney 
General and other government officials for violations of a wide range 
of rights in connection with their detentions. They assert 
constitutional and international human rights violations, and seek 
money damages. The international human rights claims have 
triggered the usual litany of threshold objections. But international 
human rights principles might also inform the constitutional claims 
we have advanced. For example, we argue that detaining foreign 
nationals in immigration proceedings without evidence that they are 
dangerous or a flight risk, and continuing to detain them after their 
immigration cases have been finally resolved and they were ready 
and willing to leave, violates due process because it constitutes 
 
83. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
84. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307 (JG) (E.D.N.Y. filed April 2002). 
See www.ccr-ny.org. 
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arbitrary detention. The international human rights prohibitions 
against arbitrary detention that we cite as an independent basis for 
recovery might also be employed to buttress our constitutional 
claims. The fact that international human rights treaties prohibit 
arbitrary detention85 could be said to shore up the constitutional 
arguments for a due process prohibition on arbitrary detention. And 
international human rights decisions defining arbitrary detention 
might provide guidance in outlining the contours of the Due Process 
Clause. 
The government argues that its detentions were authorized 
by immigration law, but here, too, international human rights law 
may be informative, much as it was in Ma v. Reno.86 If the 
immigration law were interpreted to permit detention of foreign 
nationals without evidence of danger or flight risk, and to permit 
continued detention even after their immigration cases have been 
resolved, it would conflict with international human rights norms 
against arbitrary detention. Accordingly, under The Charming Betsy, 
the court should interpret immigration law not to authorize such 
detention. 
International law claims may also have a less direct effect on 
the interpretation of statutes. In Rasul v. Bush,87 the Guantanamo 
enemy combatant case, lawyers for the families of the detainees 
challenged the detentions on a variety of grounds, including 
international law. One of their most prominent claims was that the 
laws of war required that detainees be afforded some sort of hearing 
to determine whether in fact they were enemy combatants.88 The 
Supreme Court did not address these claims because it limited its 
review to the threshold jurisdictional question whether the litigants 
had any access to U.S. courts at all. But while the Court’s ultimate 
decision reads as a wholly domestic interpretation of the habeas 
corpus statute, its result was very likely driven by the international 
human rights concerns raised by the Administration’s position that it 
 
85. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 49, and American Convention on Human 
Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 7, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, 147 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American 
Convention], which both include provisions barring arbitrary detention. 
86. 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded on other grounds; 
see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
87. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. 
88. Brief on the Merits for Petitioners at 23-29, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466 (2004) (No. 03-334), available at http:// www.ccr-ny.org/v2/rasul_v_bush 
/legal/unitedStates/Brief%20for%20Petitioners%20Rasul%20v.%20Bush.pdf. 
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has unfettered authority to impose indefinite incommunicado 
detention without any legal limit. 
B. Public Advocacy 
The Rasul litigation also illustrates the critical role that 
international human rights law can play in the larger sphere beyond 
the courtroom. The Guantanamo litigants prevailed not because of 
the strength of their legal arguments in court—the majority’s 
statutory construction argument is more than a little strained, as 
Justice Scalia amply illustrates in his dissent—but because 
Guantanamo had become an international embarrassment to the 
United States. Until Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo was the symbol 
around the world for what was wrong with the United States’ “war 
on terror.” The Administration’s position that it could lock up any 
national of any country indefinitely and incommunicado without so 
much as a hearing was widely viewed as a blatant disregard of basic 
principles of the laws of war and human rights law. That 
international condemnation, reflected in open criticism from British 
law lords, public demonstrations, highly critical foreign press 
accounts, and diplomatic complaints, very likely played a role in the 
Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case in the first place, and in its 
ultimate decision to reject the Administration’s position of unfettered 
detention power. 
This example illustrates the opportunities that the current 
situation may present for international human rights advocacy 
outside the courts. As noted above, many of the Administration’s 
worst initiatives from a human rights standpoint have been directed 
at nationals of other countries, including the torture at Abu Ghraib, 
the detentions at Guantanamo and in undisclosed overseas locations, 
and the ethnic profiling and preventive detention campaigns at 
home. Precisely because these initiatives are selectively targeted at 
foreign nationals, they may be susceptible to challenge on grounds of 
international human rights law, as the British law lords’ decision 
discussed above demonstrates. Human rights law, predicated on 
human dignity, does not distinguish between citizens and 
noncitizens. Furthermore, the international community is likely to 
take a special interest in burdens that the United States selectively 
places on foreign nationals. 
In part in reaction to these initiatives, international human 
rights groups in the United States appear to have directed increased 
scrutiny at the United States’ practices, and have been effective in 
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issuing reports and shaping news coverage. Human Rights Watch 
has played an especially key role in the fallout from Abu Ghraib.89 It 
also issued an early report on the plight of the domestic detainees,90 
the findings of which were confirmed some months later when the 
Office of Inspector General issued its own comprehensive and highly 
critical report on the treatment of immigration detainees after 9/11.91 
Human Rights First released two excellent, comprehensive reviews 
of the war on terrorism, one in September 2002, and the other six 
months later, and now publishes an online review of the major 
developments of interest to the human rights community in 
connection with the war on terrorism.92 Amnesty International has 
issued a major report on racial and ethnic profiling, and published 
one of the first extensive reports on the mistreatment of domestic 
detainees after 9/11.93 
These efforts, which employ the traditional tactic of reporting 
human rights abuses with the idea of “shaming” perpetrators into 
respecting human rights norms, have been very effective in 
galvanizing resistance to the Administration’s abuses, both here and 
abroad. By speaking the language of international human rights, 
rather than utilizing an exclusively domestic constitutional or 
 
89. Reed Brody, Human Rights Watch, The Road to Abu Ghraib (2004), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf; see also Kenneth Roth, 
Human Rights Watch, Darfur and Abu Ghraib, available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
wr2k5/darfurandabughraib/darfurandabughraib/pdf. 
90. Cesar Muñoz Acebes, Human Rights Watch, Presumption of Guilt: 
Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11 Detainees (2002), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802.pdf. 
91. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The 
September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration 
Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (April 
2003) (released June 2, 2003). 
92. See, e.g., Lawyers Committee  for Human Rights, A Year of Loss: 
Reexamining Civil Liberties Since September 11 (2002), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/loss_mail.htm; Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights, Imbalance of Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law & Policy 
Since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties (2003), http://www.human 
rightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/imbalance/imbalance.htm. 
93. For the report on racial and ethnic profiling, see Amnesty 
International, U.S. Domestic Human Rights Program, Threat and Humiliation: 
Racial Profiling, National Security, and Human Rights in the United States 
(2004), http://www. Amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/index.do. For a report on 
detainee mistreatment, see Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US 
Attorney General—Amnesty International’s concerns relating to the post 11 
September investigations (November 2001), http://web.amnesty.org/library 
/index/engAMR511702001!Open. 
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statutory framework for their analysis, these reports have greater 
potential to be influential abroad, and thereby to galvanize 
international opposition along the lines seen around Guantanamo 
and Abu Ghraib. 
Some of the most effective human rights work involves a 
combination of public advocacy appealing to first principles with 
litigation pursuing more narrow legal theories. Again, Guantanamo 
is a prime example. The litigation served as a dramatic focal point for 
opposition to the Administration’s policies, but human rights 
advocates here and around the world simultaneously took on the 
Administration in the public arena for flouting international law 
principles and basic human dignity. In the end, that broader public 
advocacy very likely played a significant role in the victory in the 
Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
Administration’s position in turn galvanized still further opposition, 
for it showed that concrete results are possible.94 
C. Institutional Reform 
A third way to pursue international justice in the domestic 
arena might be more institutional or process-oriented. Instead of 
using traditional forums such as the media, public relations, and the 
courts to advance human rights concerns, advocates might think 
about building human rights consciousness into the processes of 
political decision making. In a recent article in American Prospect, 
Elisa Massimino describes a Clinton Administration innovation 
designed to do just this. Executive Order 13107, issued in 1998, 
sought to integrate human rights considerations into the domestic 
policymaking agencies, so that rather than an afterthought raised by 
human rights groups through reports, letters, or lawsuits, these 
concerns became the everyday concern of the executive branch.95 As 
 
94. For law firms’ defense of Guantanamo Bay prisoners, see, e.g., Bill 
Rankin, Lawyers fight for detainees; Ga. firm assails Guantanamo, The Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution, Nov. 30, 2005 (Allen & Overy’s representation of several 
detainees). For statements calling for the closing of the Guantanamo Bay prison 
camp, see, e.g., Biden Urges U.S. to Take Steps To Close Prison at Guantanamo, 
New York Times, June 6, 2005 (noting that the prison camp serves as a 
propaganda tool for terrorists); Cheney: U.S. Not Aiming to Close Guantanamo; 
Other Republicans Say Prison is a Liability, Washington Post, June 13, 2005 
(Senators Chuck Hagel, Mel Martinez, and Patrick Leahy call for closure of the 
detention center). 
95. Exec. Order No. 13107 (Dec. 1998) (Implementation of Human Rights 
Treaties) (committing the United States to enforcement of human rights treaties 
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Massimino details, the Order created an Interagency Working Group 
with a mandate to: 
[P]repare treaty compliance reports to the United Nations; 
respond to complaints about human-rights violations; vet 
proposed legislation for conformity with treaty 
requirements; monitor and analyze state law and practice 
on human rights; educate the public about human rights; 
and conduct a yearly review of all U.S. reservations, 
understandings, and declarations to see whether they can 
be withdrawn or whether U.S. law should be altered to 
make them unnecessary.96 
The Working Group apparently died under the Bush 
Administration (ironically, just when it was most needed). But such 
efforts to “incorporate” international human rights thinking into 
domestic lawmaking and administration should be pursued wherever 
possible. Perhaps the central challenge for international human 
rights advocates focused on the United States is to get domestic 
actors to take human rights seriously. As noted above, globalization 
has set in motion a series of incentives that are likely to make 
international law increasingly more familiar, and increasingly more 
critical to domestic decision making. But it is also important to work 
on this relationship from the inside out, by creating mechanisms and 
actors within executive institutions whose role is precisely to promote 
early consideration of human rights. Crises like Abu Ghraib—and 
memos like the Office of Legal Counsel’s August 2002 torture 
memo97—illustrate the critical importance of infusing policymaking 
at the outset with greater sensitivity to international law concerns. 
Initiatives like Executive Order 13107 offer that hope.98 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Advancing immigrants’ rights in the United States has never 
been an easy task. While the Supreme Court has often paid lip 
service to the notion that foreign nationals, at least those living in 
 
and creating an Interagency Working Group to provide guidance, oversight, and 
coordination), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo13107.htm. 
96. Elisa Massimino, Holding America Accountable, The American 
Prospect, Oct. 2004, at A14. 
97. See Torture Memo, supra note 15. 
98. The Bush Administration’s indifference to this concept suggests that it 
might be advisable to create such an office through legislation. Otherwise, the 
only administrations that will have one will be those already inclined to pay 
attention to international law. 
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the United States, are entitled to the same basic rights as U.S. 
citizens (some political participation rights aside), the nation’s record 
of anti-immigrant abuse, and the Court’s record in reviewing that 
abuse, does not live up to the Court’s promises. Foreign nationals are 
often “the course of least resistance,” and the courts have rarely 
stepped in to protect this class, one that by definition cannot protect 
itself through the political process. 
There are, to be sure, many reasons to be skeptical about how 
much international human rights can do to improve the lot of foreign 
nationals in the United States. First, the suspicion and fear of 
immigrants in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11 
threaten to taint any argument associated with immigrants’ rights 
and to bring international human rights down with it. Second, 
lawyers and judges in the United States have traditionally been 
skeptical toward the entire domain of international human rights. 
And third, immigration law in particular is especially impervious to 
rights-based claims, whatever their provenance, because it is so 
deeply defined by the notion that the immigration power is “plenary” 
and that decisions regarding the fate of immigrants are largely a 
matter of political discretion only loosely constrained by legal limits. 
But there are also reasons for hope. The attacks of September 
11 and their aftermath have made it clearer than ever that we are 
dependent upon the good will of the rest of the world, and fidelity to 
international human rights is critical to maintaining the legitimacy 
of our security efforts. The skepticism of lawyers and judges is giving 
way to the realities of a globalized world, in which transnational 
exchange makes transnational norms more and more necessary. And 
because immigration law’s “plenary power” finds its source in 
international law conceptions of sovereignty, it is especially well-
suited to the limitations that international law is beginning to 
impose on sovereignty, in particular through the last half-century’s 
development of human rights. 
In exploiting these opportunities, it seems best to take a 
three-pronged approach: (1) argue narrowly in court, using 
international human rights law principally as a guide to statutory 
and constitutional interpretation rather than as an independent and 
freestanding source of rights of action; (2) turn the human rights 
activist’s more traditional tactics of “shaming” on the United States 
itself, attempting to mobilize international opinion by invoking 
internationally based claims; and (3) seek out ways to 
“institutionalize” human rights concerns into the domestic 
lawmaking and law enforcement policy process. 
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History is likely to identify the current period as a paradigm 
shift. We have the forces of history on our side. If we pursue these 
aims through thoughtful invocations of international human rights, 
we may yet rediscover the “idea of humanity” that Hermann Cohen 
so eloquently described more than 100 years ago. 
 
 
